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I.

INTRODUCTION
The worst judicial opinion ever written issued from Florida on an

anonymous day in 1864. The opinion discussed slavery. More accurately,
it cherished slavery—lionizing the then extant practice in the way the
British sing of the sea. It was a judicium horribli not unlike the most
famous U.S. legal opinion of the same era, Dred Scott v. Sandford.1 Like
Dred Scott it was a deeply flawed opinion, yet it was far more compact of
prose and rationale. In this way, as a legal precedent, it was a more
dangerous opinion than Dred Scott because it was presented not as a timid
jurist’s tortured squirmings through a broken political landscape. It was
presented as something basic, something fundamental and inexorable,
something not to be questioned. It was dangerously simple when conveyed
to accepting minds in the way a cold knife is dangerous in angered hands.
The opinion is therefore a vital study for researchers looking for the lines
of human fallacy that in the American past have demarcated those regions
of thought where the pretense of law dissolves real legal foundational
principles like freedom or justice. And yet, somehow, the opinion has not
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Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 15 L.Ed. 691, 1856 WL 8721
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been studied; it is at present nearly forgotten. The opinion is Miller v.
Gaskins, 11 Fla. 73 (1864). Before discussing the case, I will first sift the
literal soil from which it sprang.
II.

THE SHORT SAD STORY OF MIDDLE FLORIDA
Spain conquered the New World, and for more than two centuries

after Ponce de Leon, Florida was a possession of Spain.2 The Spanish
territory’s first experience of U.S. influence began in 1799 and reached a
high point during General Andrew Jackson’s 1818 military expedition
against the Seminoles and Red Sticks.3 During the Spanish era, the
territory called Florida was a naval waystation; a geographic identity that
persisted once it became a U.S. possession.
There was a port and city in the panhandle at Pensacola, a naval
depot at Key West, a port and city on the Atlantic at Jacksonville, an
administrative settlement just south at St. Augustine, and, excepting
groups of Native Americans and a smattering of African Americans
branded as runaways,4 little else in terms of populace within the vast fifty2

With the limited exception of brief periods of British rule and French

adventurism.
3

Paul E. Hoffman, FLORIDA’S FRONTIERS 274-279 (Indiana Univ. Press

2002); Walter W. Manley II ed., et. al., THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
AND ITS PREDECESSOR COURTS, 1821-1917
4

3 (1997 Univ. Press of Fla.).

The Native American Seminole tribes of northern Florida were never

conquered by the Spanish, and during the Spanish Era in Florida, they
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thousand square mile triangle of space between the Atlantic, the Gulf of
Mexico, and Georgia.5 In its interior, this Florida was a frontier,
influenced by the temperate climes, the Spanish, the sea, and a pioneering,
individualistic ‘Cracker’culture subsisting on tiny smallholding farms and
cattle pens.6

were joined in their forests and marshes by groups of African Americans
escaping from slavery in Georgia, then known as Maroons. Sean Michael
O’Brien, IN BITTERNESS AND IN TEARS: ANDREW JACKSON’S
DESTRUCTION OF THE CREEKS AND SEMINOLES 32, 188 (The Lyons Press
2003).
5

Manley, supra note 3 at 3-4, 187; Spanish territorial Florida was larger

than the present-day U.S. state, stretching so far to the west so as to
include the cities of Baton Rouge, Natchez, and Mobile. Michael Gannon,
ed., THE NEW HISTORY OF FLORIDA 150, 164 (Univ. Press of Fla. 1996);
Nicholas De Fer, (Map) Les costes aux environs de la Riviere de Misisipi
[1705], LEWIS ANSBACHER MAP COLLECTION No. 134, 4th Floor, Map
Room, Main Branch, Jacksonville Public Library, Jacksonville, Florida
(accessed September 7, 2006).
6

Larry Eugene Rivers, SLAVERY IN FLORIDA: TERRITORIAL DAYS TO

EMANCIPATION 253 (2000 Univ. Press of Fla.). On territorial Florida’s
distinctive ‘Cracker’ culture, see note 12, infra.
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With the Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819, ratified in 1821, Florida was
ceded to the United States.7 And while U.S. territorial Florida was
adjacent to and contiguous with states that we now call ‘the South’ or ‘the
Old South,’ Florida at the time of its annexation from Spain was not at all
Southern.
This changed once the economic, social, and cultural institution
that was plantation agriculture was imported into that swath of inland
space known then as ‘Middle Florida,’ the land in today’s northern Florida
between the Suwanee and Apalachicola rivers.8 Cotton was the world’s
most important and arbitraged commodity in the early nineteenth century,9
and Middle Florida ran on it.
7

Michael Gannon, FLORIDA: A SHORT HISTORY 27-28 (2003 Univ. Press

of Fla.).
8

Rivers, supra note 6 at 47 (showing map); David R. Colburn and Jane L.

Landers, eds., THE AFRICAN AMERICAN HERITAGE OF FLORIDA 105 (1995
Univ. Press of Fla.).
9

See Steven Yafa, BIG COTTON: HOW A HUMBLE FIBER CREATED

FORTUNES, WRECKED CIVILIZATIONS, AND PUT AMERICA ON THE MAP 8690 (Viking Penguin 2005)(By 1825, the young United States exported 171
million pounds of raw cotton to Great Britain annually; cotton’s nickname
in the nineteenth century U.S. South was “white gold”; financing the U.S.
cotton production created the London financial giants Barclays and
Lloyds).
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The scions and heads of wealthy planting families seated in North
Carolina, Virginia, and Tennessee emigrated to Middle Florida in numbers
during the 1820s, 30s and 40s—there they chased rich soils and a lack of
established land ownership.10 These ‘legacy planters’ snatched up tracts of
land for growing cotton, first through squatting, and later through hardsought political favors from the territorial government in Tallahassee.11
These planters were Southern, they were different in means, class and
outlook from their smallholding cracker12 neighbors, and they quickly
organized and consolidated control over most of the Florida Territory’s

10

Rivers, supra note 6 at 10; Colburn et. al., supra note 8 at 129 (noting a

contemporaneous newspaper account of the soils in Middle Florida as the
finest agricultural district in the United States).
11

Baptist, infra note 14 at 91.

12

During the territorial period, a Florida Cracker was a (usually white)

settler or pioneer who typically subsisted on growing corn in small areas,
hunting, fishing, and herding cattle and hogs. Dana St. Claire, CRACKER:
THE CRACKER CULTURE IN FLORIDA HISTORY 10 (Museum of Arts and
Sciences 1998). Some Crackers eschewed livestock raising and instead
subsisted on fishing or shellfish harvesting in Florida’s rivers and beaches.
Id. at 68. By the time of the Civil War, ‘cracker’ referred generally to any
white person living in Florida who was not a slaveowner. Id. at 51.

Winter for Purehearts
By Michael Cavendish*

local and territorial politics.13 And they grew much wealthier, producing
great yields of cotton and setting up their own banks to attract further
credit and investment from European commodity speculators.14 Within a
decade, some counties in Middle Florida were among the wealthiest in the
entire South.15 It was a boom economy; it ran on slave labor.
Money and farming techniques were not all the planters brought
with them from the Old South. There was a widespread belief among
Southern plantation owners and their families that they existed as a kind of
American nobility or gentry16—as real as the English feudal nobility and
gentry that survived into the times when many of the planters and their
parents were born.
A planter of Virginian origin might refer to himself as a
‘cavalier,’17 a direct reference to a knight-type of fighting person serving
13

Rivers, supra note 6 at 14; Gannon, supra note 7 at 40; Colburn et. al.,

supra note 8 at 130.
14

Edward E. Baptist, CREATING AN OLD SOUTH: MIDDLE FLORIDA’S

PLANTATION FRONTIER BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 111 (Univ. of North
Carolina Press 2002); Hoffman, supra note 3 at 298-300.
15

Rivers, supra note 6 at 252.

16

Baptist, supra note 14 at 7.

17

Baptist, supra note 14 at 2; Yaffa, supra note 9 at 162 (describing the

romanticized preferred southern planter identity as being descended from
royalist exiles escaping from Cromwell’s England); see generally
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the English Crown during the seventeenth-century reign of Charles II.
Planters all over the Old South were keen on the medieval-era novels of
Sir Walter Scott, e.g., Ivanhoe, and imagined themselves as the real
successors to Scott’s fictional characters.18 Hyper-romanticism and mythmaking19 were everywhere; wealthy people were styling themselves not
just as wealthy but as a real aristocracy.20 It was a collective exercise in
taking on airs, but it had a savage dark side—an ideology of white
supremacy.21

William R. Taylor, CAVALIER AND YANKEE: THE OLD SOUTH AND
AMERICAN NATIONAL CHARACTER (Doubleday New York 1963).
18

Baptist, supra note 14 at 250.

19

Yaffa describes a set of carefully constructed core values the southern

planter imputed to himself, and followed, as a sort of secular religion, as
including honor, chivalry, bravery, and the importance of lineage. See
Yaffa, supra note 9 at 159.
20

Baptist, supra note 14 at 261.

21

See, e.g., Yaffa, supra note 9 at 150 (“Southern whites genuinely

believed blacks could not fend for themselves [ . . .]”). But this was an
atypically nuanced white supremacy insofar as it existed outside of any
real feudal or monarchical political system and was premised upon equal
parts racial consciousness and class consciousness. According to historical
reviews of generally held social beliefs of the age, the planters also
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The Middle Florida planters transformed much of Florida into a
Southern state quickly. By the 1861 outbreak of the Civil War, Florida
was home to 61,000 enslaved African Americans.22 Florida was the third
state to secede from the Union.23 Florida sent eighty percent of its eligible
adult men into the Confederacy’s army, and shipped tons of assistance to
the grey troops in the manner of food and supplies.24 Florida supplied the
Confederacy with three significant generals and a secretary of the navy,
and Florida’s secession-era Governor, Joseph Milton, committed suicide
rather than see the state captured by U.S. forces.25 The Civil War nearly
began at Pensacola’s Santa Rosa Island during a standoff between U.S.
naval and infantry forces stationed at Fort Pickens and 5,000 massed

believed themselves to be superior to their white Cracker neighbors. See
Baptist, supra note 14 at 90, 103; Hoffman, supra note 3 at 303.
22

Manley et. al., supra note 3 at 187.

23

Manley et. al., supra note 3 at 189; Gannon, supra note 7 at 41.

24

Id. at 193; The army-filling was accomplished in part through a new

conscription law, which, it should be said, was resisted by a substantial
number of Florida men with pro-U.S. leanings, often at the risk of their
lives. See Gannon et. al., supra note 5 at 234-236.
25

Gannon, supra note 7 at 46.
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confederate troops commanded by General Braxton Bragg.26 After the
Civil War was finished, Florida’s Legislature, still controlled by the
planters and their allies, passed one of the harshest anti-black codes27 in
the country; banning African Americans from moving into the state, and
prescribing punishments like whipping, pillories, and forced labor for new,
black-only offenses.28
III.

MILLER V. GASKINS
The setting for Miller v. Gaskins was this same antebellum Middle

Florida; specifically, Wakulla County. Wakulla County is that especially
picturesque inverted triangle of space lying south from Tallahassee, laying
between the St. Marks and Ochlocknee Rivers, terminating in the Gulf of
Mexico at places named Shell Point and Alligator Point.
The case tells the story of Thomas G. Gaskins, a planter who died
in the summer of 1862.29 At the time of Thomas’ death, a woman named

26

Gannon et al., supra note 5 at 233 (noting that the fighting ending the

standoff at Pensacola’s Fort Pickens finally broke out two days after the
famous firing on Fort Sumter, South Carolina).
27

Id. at 48 (“these so called Black Codes represented an attempt by the

former slaveholders to reinstitute the slave system in fact if not in law.”).
28

See Donald G. Nieman, TO SET THE LAW IN MOTION: THE FREEDMEN’S

BUREAU AND THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF BLACKS, 1865-1868 86-98 (1979).
29

Miller v. Gaskins, 11 Fla. 73, 1864 WL 1117 *1 (Fla. 1864).
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Sarah resided at the Gaskins’ household as a slave.30 Thomas also had a
trusted friend at the time of his passing, Charles K. Miller.31 Out of guilt
perhaps, or sympathy, or a form of humanity, Thomas had made out a will
before dying “bequeathing” Sarah to the stalwart Charles Miller, but “in
trust,” so that Sarah would be allowed “to go, if she wishes, to any free
[s]tate.”32 Thomas’ will went further and authorized an expenditure of up
to a hundred dollars from what would become his estate after death to
arrange for Sarah’s needs and transport.33
As to Sarah, the case recites that it was complained of by Thomas’
family heirs that Charles Miller largely did his friend’s bidding and
arranged for her to leave her situation at the Gaskins farm, directing her to
go where she would without restraint, without subjecting herself to the
authority of Miller or anyone else.34

30

See id.

31

Id.

32

Id. at * 1-2. Sarah’s options for destinations out of Middle Florida might

likely have included black and Indian settlements in southern and central
Florida, and also the Bahamas, and settlements in Cuba and Mexico, in
addition to the free states of in the northern U.S. See Colburn et. al. supra
note 8 at 120; Gannon et. al., supra note 5 at 181.
33

Miller, 11 Fla. 71, 1864 WL 1117 at * 2.

34

Id.
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The case arose when Thomas’ grandchildren, assisted by a
guardian, sued to void the ‘Sarah clause’ in Thomas’ will, and to force her
sale back into slavery through auction, with the proceeds going to the
estate, and thence to them.35 The grandchildren won this relief before a
state trial court, and after losing, Charles Miller petitioned the Supreme
Court of Florida, seeking a reversal and a ruling that he acted legally under
the authority of a valid will.36
Eight years before this dispute reached the Florida high court, the
Supreme Court of the United States decided Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. 393, 19 How. 393, 15 L.Ed. 691 (1856). Dred Scott was the notorious
case in which an African American man, Dred Scott, filed a lawsuit in a
Missouri federal district court, seeking freedom for himself, his wife
Harriet, and their two children.37 Scott won in the district court, but then
was re-enslaved by the pens of the majority-voting U.S. Supreme Court
justices, lead by Roger Taney, on the grounds that the district court below

35

See id.

36

Id.

37

Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 397-399, 19 How. 393, 15 L.Ed.

691 (1856); see also Don E. Fehrenbacher, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS
SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 239-49 (Oxford U. Press
1978).
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could not have properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction over Scott’s
plaintiffcy.38
Because of its extreme notoriety, and since it was decided well
before Miller v. Gaskins, Dred Scott was likely known to the Supreme
Court of Florida Justices deciding Miller, and probably seemed to be a
natural analogue to the controversy before them in some respects.
Not unlike Justice Taney’s extreme narrowness of focus on subject
matter jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Florida framed Miller solely as a
will contest that would be decided by divining whether the Sarah clause in
Thomas’ will was effective or void. Following the customs of the law of
estates, the first thing the Miller v. Gaskins court did was look to the
testator’s intent in framing the Sarah clause in the will.39 Thomas had, in
the five clauses preceding it, bequeathed the other men and women
residing at his farm in slavery to his heirs; he gave a grandson a woman
named Nelly, and to his granddaughter he gave a woman named Rose.40
And in each of those preceding bequests, Thomas had referred to the
bequeathed people as slaves, viz. “my slave Nelly.”41 But in the Sarah

38

See id.

39

Miller, 11 Fla. 73, 1864 WL 1117 at *2-3.

40

See id.

41

See id.
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clause, he had only referred to Sarah by her name, without the crippling
title of ‘slave.’42
The Miller v. Gaskins court turned the Sarah clause in Thomas’
will over and over like a prism, looking at every angle, importing probable
intent into his every word. And afterwards, the Court decided that Thomas
did mean to place Sarah under Charles Miller’s ‘trusteeship,’ but not his
ownership or control. 43
What Thomas wanted for Sarah had been done before. As early as
a half-decade before Miller issued, the Virginia Supreme Court had
approved a will releasing several African Americans formerly held as
slaves into freedom.44 George Washington famously provided in his own
will that the persons held as slaves at his home were to be freed upon his
death.45
All that was left of the work the Miller court gave to itself at this
point was to decide whether the Sarah clause was valid. At this point, the
Florida Justices very probably looked to Dred Scott again. But perhaps it
was not Justice Taney’s majority opinion from which they would draw
their inspiration.
42

See id. at *1.

43

Id. at *3.

44

Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call.) 270 (1799).

45

Paul Finkelman, “Let Justice Be Done, Though the Heavens May Fall”:

The Law of Freedom, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 325, 329 (1994).
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Justice Taney’s Dred Scott opinion repeatedly apologized46 for the
decision he was writing. He forlornly offered that while certainly African
Americans were part of the same human family that the Declaration of
Independence declared “created equal,” there was also, to his mind,
incontrovertible proof that the Framers of the Constitution intended to
exclude blacks as citizens and full-fledged people.47
Not so with the concurring opinions in Dred Scott. The concurring
opinions were bullying. The Dred Scott concurring justices added their
sundry thoughts atop Taney’s moping formalism in turns, scourging the
notion that Scott could be considered ‘a man’ as of the time they were
writing.48 They beat away at Scott’s humanity as if it were a garish piñata.
46

See for example Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 405 (“it is not the province of the

court to decide the . . . injustice . . . or impolicy of these laws [ . . .]”),
407 (“It is difficult . . . to realize the state of public opinion in relation to
that unfortunate race . . . when the Constitution of the United States was
framed and adopted . . .[b]ut the public history . . . displays it in a manner
too plain to be mistaken.”), 426 (“No one, we presume, supposes that any
change in public opinion or feeling, in relation to this unfortunate race . . .
should induce the court to give . . . the Constitution a more liberal
construction [ . . .]”).
47

See id. at 407, 411-412.

48

These ranged from the perfunctory, id. at 469 (“the plaintiff is a slave,

and therefore not entitled to sue in a court of the United States”)(Grier, J.,
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To justify the propriety of the institution of slavery, they invoked the
historical example of England, and then the Romans.49 They went far
beyond Taney’s pale, eager to outdo one another in adding just one more
reason to keep Scott shackled. The dark enthusiasm of the concurring
justices seeps through the text of their opinions even today.
concurring) and at 529 (“Scott . . . is a slave, and was so when this suit
was brought.”)(Catron, J., concurring), to the punctilious, id. at 470 (“the
plaintiff was not a citizen of the State of Missouri . . . but was a negro of
African descent [ . . .] )(Daniel, J., concurring)(emphasis in the original),
to the pseudo-Mosaic, id. at 475 (“Now the following are truths which a
knowledge of the history of the world . . . compels . . .the African negro
race have never been acknowledged as belonging to the family of nations [
. . .]”)(Daniel, J., concurring), to the quasi-genocidal id. at 475-76 (“[a
slave] is himself strictly property, to be used in subserviency to the
interests, the convenience, or the will, of his owner [ . . .]”)(Daniel, J.
concurring)(emphasis in the original). Douglas R. Egerton has made the
insightful comment that as to someone held in slavery against their will,
magistracy of this type is nothing more than the doings of a well dressed
mob. D.R. Egerton, HE SHALL GO OUT FREE: THE LIVES OF DENMARK
VEASEY 181 (1999 Madison House Pub.).
49

Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 477-80, (Daniel, J., concurring), and at 490

(Campbell, J., concurring). The majority opinion also blamed the origin of
the institution of American slavery upon England. See id. at 407-08.
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Perhaps writing with the Dred Scott concurrences in mind, to cap
the analysis of the Sarah clause, the Miller v. Gaskins court penned what is
incontrovertibly the most shameful sentence in the whole history of
Florida law:
There is no evil against which the policy of our laws is
more pointedly directed than that of allowing slaves to
have any other status than that of pure slavery.50
The trial court would be affirmed. Sarah would be sold into slavery all
over again. Following this sentence, those were foregone conclusions.
IV.

ANTICANON
Miller v. Gaskins is what some constitutional law theorists are

labeling an ‘anticanon.’51 If a case like Brown v. Board of Education and
its ‘separate is not equal’ message is considered a ‘canon’52of
50

51

Miller, 11 Fla. 73, 1864 WL 1117 at *4.
See for example Sharon E. Rush, The Anticanonical Lesson of

Huckleberry Finn, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 577-78 (Summer
2002); Richard Primus, Canon, Anticannon, and Judicial Dissent, 48
DUKE L.J. 243 (1998);
52

In certain recitations of constitutional theory every anticanon needs a

canon, a case shining that light of agreed right-ness, to complement it. It
may be that the complementary cannon to Miller v. Gaskins is actually an
English case decided some eighty years before Florida plunged into the
depths of “pure slavery”—Somerset v. Stewart, 1 Lofft 1, 98 Eng. Rep.
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constitutional law for its normative right-ness, an opinion like Miller is
considered the opposite, a case somehow pushed so far away from the
generally agreed way that things ‘ought to be’ that its very normative
wrong-ness, its absence of virtue, allows it to instruct theorists and
students alike as a negative example; an anti-canon.53
499, 499 (K.B. 1772); see also generally Steven M. Wise, THOUGH THE
HEAVENS MAY FALL 179-184 (2005 Da Capo/Perseus Press). In that
opinion, a Jamaican black man who lived in slavery, James Somerset,
traveled to England and sued there for his freedom, much like Dred Scott
would many years later. Id. In deciding Somerset, the Chief Justice of the
King’s Bench, Lord Mansfield, ruled in favor of Mr. Somerset’s freedom.
Id. In what would have created the bitterest irony for Dred Scott had it
been brought to his attention, what enabled Lord Mansfield to find slavery
illegal as a matter of substantive law was the fact that England had no
written constitution or bill of rights that excluded blacks, while at the same
time, blacks and whites were not treated unequally by the common law.
See Finkelman, supra note 45 at 325-26. Had England at the time of the
opinion had a written bill of rights, James Somerset might have met Dred
Scott’s same fate.
53

Professor Mark Graber has explained the canon/anticannon concept,

albeit without the labels, thus: “[c]ontemporary constitutional theory rests
on [these] premises. Brown v. Board of education was correct [ . . .] Dred
Scott v. Sandford was . . . wrong.” Mark A. Graber, Desparately Ducking
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Dred Scott is a well known anticannon. Dred Scott has now been
cited or discussed in excess of 4000 times in judicial opinions and
scholarly legal literature.54 Hardly a year goes by in which two or three
legal intellectuals in the academy or on the bench do not pick it up and
turn it over, looking for some further lesson to impart from it.55
Miller v. Gaskins, in contrast, has been ignored, cited in but one
other legal opinion56--for a banal rule of substantive law relating to the
testator’s intent under a will—and briefly mentioned in a history book57 on
the Supreme Court of Florida. That Miller has been so overlooked ought
to be remedied, since it contains anticanonical lessons of equal value to
those found in Dred Scott.
Slavery: Dred Scott and Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 14 CONST.
COMMENT. 271 (Summer 1997).
54

These can be counted with the use of a citation aggregator such as

West’s online Key Cite feature.
55

See for example Graber, supra note 53 at 272 (“Proponents of judicial

restraint maintain that [the opinion] demonstrates the evils that result when
federal justices prevent the elected branches of government from resolving
major social disputes. Originalists maintain that [the opinion]
demonstrates the evils that result when constitutional authorities fail to be
tethered by precedent [ . . .]”).
56

That opinion is Rewis v. Rewis, 84 So. 93 (Fla. 1920).

57

See Manley, supra note 3 at 195.
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Return to the sentence. Focus on the fourth word, “evil.” In the
sentence, evil is used to label two objects; freedom, or a “status [other]
than that of pure slavery,” and also a type of equity or leniency in the law,
that quality that would allow Thomas’ humanitarian will to be done.58 The
sentence marries two legal ideas, personal freedom in the human rights
context and freedom of intent from the common law tradition, and by fiat
assigns a moral/religious value to them, a value that is exactly the opposite
of the value that the vast majority of contemporary civilized thought and
the vast majority of legal and judicial scholarship would assign to those
ideas. “Evil,” as used here, is dehumanizing to Sarah; a usage that paints
her humanity as anti-moral, anti-jurisprudential, and even anti-theological.
It is a usage that is also inappropriately uncivil.59
Words eight through eleven, “policy of our laws,” are the Miller
court’s attempt to shoehorn an artificial volksgeist,60 the use of the myth58

59

See Miller, 11 Fla. 73, 1864 WL 1117 at *4.
By uncivil, I refer not to a complaint over manners but rather to a usage

of language that both obscures the substantive legal issue at hand and robs
the subject of that language of their dignity. See Michael Cavendish,
Civility In Written Advocacy, THE BENCHER 10-11 (July/August 2005).
60

Volksgeist was a German romantic idea coined by Herder, suggesting

that each people had their own recognizable “special genius,” that lead to
the unsurprising follow-on idea that each nation or culture of peoples
should be left to cultivate this special quality of theirs. See this definition
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invoking “our,” into an appeal to public policy. “Our” as used here is an
interpolation of a notion of a homogenous folk group and their supremacy,
a supremacy that takes precedence over anything else.
The final two words in the sentence, “pure slavery,” connote a
totalitarian approach to lawfinding. The Miller court wanted no
exceptions, no shades of gray in their slave law. It was to be “pure
slavery” for Florida, with no room for questioning or dissent. “Pure
slavery” also suggests a kind of search for purity—purity of ideology in
the white supremacist ideas that lurked behind Florida’s pro-slavery laws.
Viewing the sentence as a whole against the backdrop of my
dissective efforts, I can sketch two preliminary lessons that reveal some of
the danger Miller presents.
The sentence is historicist. Historicity is the practice of according
value to something, across a spectrum of like things, in accordance with
the perceived legitimacy or brilliancy of its historical pedigree.61 At the
time Miller issued, many citizens in Florida, and particularly within
at sparknotes.com online study guide,
http://www.sparknotes.com/history/european/1848/terms/term_29.html
(accessed August 2, 2006).
61

For a good introduction to the potential problems created by historicist

elements in legal thought, and an introduction to the concept of historicity,
see Richard A. Posner, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 168-192 (Harvard
Univ. Press 2004).
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Middle Florida, were wrapped in a false sense of history that, according to
its adherents, extended the institution of human slavery and the
corresponding tenet of white supremacy from times immemorial up to
their present.62 These historical ideas were wildly inaccurate, although not
to the Court’s perception of history. Florida had been a pro-slavery
territory only for a matter of decades at the time, there was half a nation
north of Florida that disagreed with the propriety of slavery, and Great
Britain, Florida’s new ‘mother country’ after annexation, had abolished
slavery decades earlier. The historicist ideas imbued in Miller’s awful
sentence essentially masked within a popular legend or fake folk history
some very blunt, brutal political and cultural preferences as to where the
teeth of the law would bite.63
The sentence is also imperialist. I use the term imperialism here to
mean a group’s continuum of behavior that trends toward the aggressive
and that is directed against other groups by both formal and informal
means.64 The Miller v. Gaskins court did not just decide the case before it.
62

For an example of this, look no further than reports of the public

remarks of Alexander Stephens, the Vice President of the Confederacy,
who lauded slavery and racial inequality as the “cornerstones” of the
southern nation. Finkelman, supra note 45 at 348.
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See Posner, supra note 61 at 168.
I borrow this definition from G. Randal Hornaday, who used the term in

a review of the same cultural phenomenon that gave rise to Miller v.
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The Miller court wanted slavery for “our,” for “us,” for all of Florida, and
beyond, for the great-great-grandchildren of the justices. This was an
exportation of an ideology with the goal of ensconcing it in perpetuity, up
in the fancied ether.
Miller’s brand of imperialist lawgiver is anathema to a free society
because the imperialist’s frame of reference is that he will decide the law
before deciding the case, putting the interest of whatever the source of the
imperialism is, be it a regime or an idea, ahead of the rights or interests of
the lawsuit parties. The calling card of this imperialism, as I use the
concept, is not the substance of the idea being pushed, it is the pushing
itself, and the attendant subjugation of rights, responsibilities, comity,
polity, process, pluralism, intellectual rigor, or due process. It is the
bending of all of these hallmarks of a free society to the imperialists’
wants or will.
Here is why these anticanonical lessons, these faults of thought,
require the result that the opinion is dangerous. A legacy of Miller v.
Gaskins is that it marked a kind of ‘winter for purehearts.’ To most, that
description paints what must have seemed to Florida blacks and white
abolitionists of the era to be the bitterest nadir in that period of
slaveocracy in Middle Florida—a time when it seemed that the law, the
Gaskins—the pre-Civil War slave culture of the U.S. South. G. Randal
Hornaday, The Forgotten Empire: Pre-Civil War Southern Imperialism,
36 CONN. L. REV. 225, 233 (Fall 2003).
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just laws, had vanished and would not return. But consider that common
experience and history teach that there were people living then, as there
are now,65 for whom there is painted an opposite bleakness; their despair
at the deliberate advance of the Union troops the year the opinion issued,
freeing chained men and women from plantations one mile at a time,
spoiling the mythical Eden imagined by the planters and their families.
One winter ended, the other, what the overwhelming majority of
Americans would describe as the false winter, persists. And this despairing
fact, the very existence of antipodal views of the right-ness of the times
surrounding the case, the fact that there are, somewhere, accepting hands
waiting for the cold knife that is that terrible sentence, is precisely why
Miller is a danger that ought to be studied instead of forgotten. Miller v.
Gaskins is an anticannon if ever there was one. Like Dred Scott, it is an
American legal opinion and a part of American legal heritage in need of
thousands of discussions.
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See for example Amy Keller, Hate in the Sunshine State, FLORIDA TREND Vol. 49, No.

6, 80-84 (September 2006)(cataloguing active white supremacist hate groups in Florida).

